In the days of physical, Earth-based assets, sovereignty was a relatively easy concept to grasp. Governments who owned the asset owned the system.
But as the role of space-based technology has grown, who truly owns the systems governments rely on has become much harder to define. There are no defined borders in space. And the materials and technology required to build satellites and the infrastructure that supports them depend on a vast and complex global supply chain. Add factors like cyber security, regulatory frameworks, sustainability, and an extremely competitive marketplace to the mix, and any claim to absolute ownership becomes dubious at best.
The scale of the challenge, though, doesn’t change the fact that space sovereignty has become a defining concern for governments investing in satellite capability. Yet the term can describe very different priorities, spanning from where a satellite is manufactured to who has access to the data it produces.
These distinctions matter because sovereignty cannot be judged by a single label. A satellite may be built domestically while relying on overseas components. A communications service may be nationally owned but depend on infrastructure operated beyond its jurisdiction.
So, is it even possible to define space sovereignty?
In our view, it starts with control. Control over the technology, the data and, most crucially, the service itself. For governments, the real question is how much control they retain over the satellite capability they depend on when they need it most.
Sovereignty begins in the supply chain
Control over a satellite system starts with the supply chain behind it. A programme may be designed and assembled domestically while still relying on critical components sourced from a small number of overseas suppliers.
The risk lies in concentration. If only one country or manufacturer controls an essential part, disruption can affect production, maintenance or future expansion. Full national self-sufficiency is rarely realistic, but governments can reduce exposure by understanding where dependencies lie and building credible alternatives around the most critical technologies.
In this way, supply-chain sovereignty therefore depends on resilience, or in practice, the ability to keep a programme moving when one source becomes unavailable.
Ownership and assured access are different questions
Some governments have pursued sovereignty through communications systems developed under national control. For example, the UK government owns the SKYNET 6 programme but contracts specialist companies to build and manage different parts of it. France follows a comparable principle with Syracuse IV, a secure military satellite communications system operated by the French Armed Forces, which was built by private companies in the aerospace sector.
These models show that sovereignty does not require the government to perform every function itself. Control can be retained through ownership and contractual authority to determine how the capability is used.
Commercial services can also form part of this model. The UK’s approach combines capabilities it owns with allied cooperation and access to external capacity. The deciding factor is whether access remains assured and the government can retain priority when capacity is constrained.
Who owns the data?
Confidence in the satellite itself only goes so far. A government may have secure access to a LEO constellation for connectivity, but still have limited control over how its communications are handled across the wider network. Such is the risk of sole reliance on transcontinental megaconstellations.
And even if that government has priority access to commercial satellite capacity, sovereignty depends on its ability to control how that capacity is allocated, whether the traffic is routed through potentially compromised terrestrial infrastructure, and who ultimately has control over the service.
The same applies to Earth observation (EO) data. Though a government may be confident in the satellite collecting EO data, they may still have limited control over it after it is collected. Information may pass through ground stations in another country, enter a commercial cloud environment or travel through deep-sea cables, and therefore may be processed under a different legal jurisdiction.
Data sovereignty depends on full visibility across that journey, and an example of a system that delivers far greater visibility is a gatewayless satellite architecture. Gatewayless architectures provide a more secure alternative for governments seeking greater control over their data, and this applies to both broadband connectivity and Earth observation. With this model, data is transported directly between satellites using laser links, superseding ground stations and public networks. The key here is control not only of where the data goes, but how it gets there.
This example reflects a broader principle: sovereignty over satellite data ultimately depends on whether governments can access it when they need it most.
Network architecture determines operational control
A separate question is whether a communications service remains available when surrounding infrastructure is disrupted. Networks that depend on fixed gateways and terrestrial connections can inherit the vulnerabilities of those systems.
Greater autonomy in space can reduce that exposure. Inter-satellite links allow traffic to move across the network before reaching the ground, limiting reliance on a small number of access points.
Availability also depends on who governs the service. Transcontinental mega constellations have demonstrated the value of broad coverage and rapid deployment, but capacity remains allocated by the operator responsible for the network. Governments therefore need clarity over their access rights when demand rises, or alternative communications routes fail.
Access to more specialised, high-priority spectrum is one way to overcome this, ensuring high-speed connectivity can be maintained when it is needed most.
Operational sovereignty is measured by whether essential connectivity remains available under pressure and whether the user retains sufficient influence over its allocation.
The litmus test
The different forms of satellite sovereignty all point to the same underlying question: how much control does a government retain over the capability it depends on?
Ownership provides only part of the answer. A government may retain meaningful control through contractual rights, while dependencies elsewhere in the system can weaken a capability that appears sovereign on paper. The level of control available in practice is shaped by dependencies across the entire capability, from how it is supplied and governed to the terms on which it can be accessed.
The satellite industry therefore needs a clearer basis for assessing sovereignty. Governments should be able to judge whether essential access is protected and how much influence they retain over the service. They also need visibility over any external decisions that could interrupt it.
A shared definition based on practical control would give governments a credible way to compare satellite models and judge where sovereign capability genuinely begins.
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