Actors linked to Iran have used military telecom attacks tactics, exploiting decades old telecom vulnerabilities and commercial advertising data to track US military personnel across the Gulf during the US-Israeli war on Iran, according to the Financial Times.
Iran’s military telecom attacks targeting US personnel across the Middle East exposed how outdated signaling systems can turn smartphones into tracking tools, endanger troops, and renew pressure on carriers, lawmakers and the Pentagon to secure cellular communications in wartime.
Detected through unusual SS7 location requests, the campaign shows how military telecom attacks can exploit trusted roaming links without malware or user interaction. It highlights commercial telecom vulnerability as troops depend on personal devices in areas exposed to missiles, drones, and cyber threats across the region.
Phones Become Battlefield Sensors
The tracking began in the buildup to the US-Israeli strikes on Iran in late February and continued as Tehran retaliated with missile and drone attacks, relying on the SS7 signaling requests, as well as location data harvested through ordinary smartphone advertising technology, as per the Financial Times, citing telecom data and people familiar with the matter.
It’s worth noting that the protocol flaw has been commonly known to researchers for more than a decade.
Modern conflict increasingly depends on commercial mobile infrastructure due to its availability, reliability, and familiarity. Yet, in one way or another, adversaries with access to global signaling systems can locate phones, intercept communications, deny service or study movements without installing software on the targeted device.
Gulf officials suspected Iran, or its allies, exploited roaming agreements with local carriers, while a US official revealed that Iran-associated actors used commercial ad-tech databases to track personnel in Iraq’s Kurdistan region.
That risk drives cellular networks military tracking, because service members cannot fully protect themselves by disabling location sharing or using stronger passwords. Their phones must still connect to carriers whose signaling protocols trust requests from operators worldwide.
Researchers monitoring Middle Eastern networks reportedly detected waves of SS7 pings aimed at specific devices roaming outside their home networks. The activity increased before and during the conflict involving Iran, the US and Israel, according to the reports.
Founder of the Mobile Surveillance Monitor, Gary Miller, said the data indicated a coordinated attack campaign. Some blocked requests reportedly appeared linked to an Iranian operator, suggesting selected devices were targeted rather than caught in broad automated scanning.
“Iran absolutely has capabilities to get real-time, immediate, and continuous location information. It would surprise me very much if Iran were not using SS7, or mobile network access in the region, to track US users,” Miller said.
The activity shows how commercial cellular networks weaponization can supply targeting intelligence through infrastructure built for roaming and billing.
It also raises concerns over algorithmic subscriber tracking, where repeated location requests map habits, identify sensitive sites and detect operational changes.
For deployed forces, these telecom attacks provide an advantage of intelligence to adversaries using electronic warfare. Similar risks have appeared in Ukraine, where soldiers were reportedly located through phones and drone operations relied on Russian cellular networks for deep strikes.
Carriers Face Security Pressure
Soldiers cannot solve the problem alone. It calls for tighter controls on telecom access leased to third parties, stronger carrier firewalls, public security audits and annual penetration tests capable of exposing weaknesses before hostile actors exploit them.
Pressure increased after the salt typhoon telecom hacks compromised major American carriers and senators sought cybersecurity audits.
Carriers refused to provide them, reinforcing concern that repeated breaches and military telecom attacks have produced limited accountability or regulatory consequences.
This commercial telecom vulnerability extends beyond SS7. Advertising identifiers and commercially available location data can help analysts isolate individual devices or groups, creating another surveillance route. Lawmakers warn that data brokers may sell digital footprints linked to government employees.
“For years I’ve warned both Democratic and Republican administrations about the national security threat posed by foreign adversaries tracking the phones of US personnel,” said Senator Ron Wyden.
The Pentagon has acknowledged reports that adversaries exploit commercial location data to monitor personnel and introduced undisclosed protection measures. However, the article argues that long contracts restrict access to newer secure services, with the current agreement running until 2034.
Addressing cellular networks military tracking requires cooperation among agencies, operators and standards bodies.
Better screening of partners could reduce commercial cellular networks weaponization, while faster termination of suspicious agreements could restrict access gained through compromised or weakly supervised carriers.
The spread of military telecom attacks shows why commercial networks now belong in military security planning.
Persistent commercial telecom vulnerability means a dependable phone can also broadcast intelligence, giving hostile actors information about movements, routines and sensitive locations.
Without stronger oversight, testing and procurement reform, military telecom attacks will remain difficult to detect and harder for users to prevent. Securing battlefield communications depends on repairing the networks behind soldiers’ phones, not simply asking personnel to stop carrying essential devices.
Inside Telecom provides you with an extensive list of content covering all aspects of the tech industry. Keep an eye on our Telecom sections to stay informed and up-to-date with our daily articles.
